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Introduction
On November 26, 2008, LandAmerica Financial Group,
Inc. (“LFG”) filed a voluntary petition in the Eastern District of Virginia, declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Federal
bankruptcy judge Kevin Huennekens closed the case on
December 22, 2015.
Before filing for bankruptcy, LFG was one of the largest
title insurance underwriters in the United States. In 2008,
the company collapsed during the Great Recession. The financial crisis caused many other companies involved in the
real estate industry to experience a similar fate. LFG’s failure was due in part to its participation in 1031 exchanges:
transactions made possible by the Tax Code to defer taxable gains upon the sale of investment property.
This paper outlines the fall of LFG and how, through
bankruptcy proceedings, LFG completed a successful liquidation of its assets—beginning with first-day motions before Judge Huennekens and ending with a return of eighty
cents on the dollar owed to unsecured creditors after complete liquidation of the company.
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The Debtor’s Business
LFG served as the holding company for various subsidiaries, collectively called LandAmerica.1 At the time of its
collapse, LandAmerica was the third largest title insurance
underwriter in the United States.2
Consider this example to understand what a title insurer does.3 Buyer wants to buy a green house. To obtain
the money to buy the house, Buyer agrees to give a mortgage on the property to Lender. Before lending the money,
however, Lender seeks a lender title insurance policy from
Insurer—a local title insurance company. Buyer covers the
cost for Lender to pay Insurer (1) to check the state of title
of the property and (2) to insure against any claims against
the property that it missed when completing its search.
Buyer obtains an $80,000 loan from Lender. Buyer uses
that money and $20,000 in savings to pay Seller for the
house. The fair market value of the house is $100,000.
Lender is over secured: the value of the property is greater
than the outstanding loan. So if Buyer immediately defaults and Lender forecloses, Lender will receive the first
$80,000 from the sale.
On the day after the sale, Lender finds out that Insurer
missed a judgment lien of $30,000 on the property when

1

2

3

Affidavit of G. William Evans, Chief Financial Officer of LandAmerica Financial
Group, Inc. and Vice President of LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Services, Inc., in
Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings at 3, In re LandAmerica
Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No.
12 [hereinafter Affidavit of G. William Evans] [https://perma.cc/G9KE-ZUW3].
Id. at 4; see also What Is Owner’s Title Insurance?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-owners-title-insurance-en-164/
(last updated Aug. 7, 2017) (“Owner’s title insurance provides protection to the
homeowner if someone sues and says they have a claim against the home from before the homeowner purchased it.”) [https://perma.cc/5CD8-DYBE].
We would like to thank Professor Gregory M. Stein for his assistance with these
four paragraphs and Figure 1.
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completing its search of the title. Lender discovers the lien
because the judgment lien holder attempts to collect the
$30,000 that it is owed by suing to foreclose on the house.
So now, because the judgment lien is senior to the mortgage, Lender will only receive $70,000 from the sale
($100,000 fair market value minus $30,000 judgment lien).
This is why Lender bought title insurance. To remedy
the situation, Insurer sends a $30,000 check to the judgment lien holder so that the judgment lien is removed from
the property.
Figure 1

LandAmerica played a key role in both the residential
and the commercial real estate markets.4 With offices and
agents throughout the United States, LandAmerica facilitated the purchase, sale, transfer, and financing of real estate.5 Its customers included residential and commercial

4
5

Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
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buyers and sellers, real estate agents and brokers, developers, attorneys, mortgage brokers and lenders, and title
insurance agents.6
Two principal title underwriting subsidiaries issued the
majority of LandAmerica’s policies: Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth NE”) and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation (“Lawyers Title”).7 Combined with Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
of New Jersey and United Capital Insurance Company,
those title underwriting subsidiaries generated about 85%
to 90% of LandAmerica’s annual revenue.8 Based upon the
volume of home sales and other usual real estate transactions, the strength of the title insurance market is closely
related to the strength of the United States economy.9 Low
interest rates and available mortgage financing help title
insurers; high interest rates and limited mortgage financing hurt them.10
Another key subsidiary was LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Services, Inc. (“Exchange Co.”).11 It operated as a
qualified intermediary under section 103112 of the Internal
Revenue Code—assisting taxpayers who sought the benefits of that provision.13 Exchange Co. did so by helping tax-

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
I.R.C. § 1031 (2012); Like-Kind Exchanges Under IRC Code Section 1031, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 2008), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/like-kind-exchangesunder-irc-code-section-1031 (“IRC Section 1031 . . . allows you to postpone paying
tax on the gain [from the sale of business or investment property] if you reinvest
the proceeds in similar property as part of a qualifying like-kind exchange.”)
[https://perma.cc/H4D6-RTKM].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 5.
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payers who sold business or investment property to structure their transactions as exchanges of one property for another of like kind.14 Taxpayers could then defer taxes on
the gains from those sales.15
As of December 31, 2006, LFG had twenty-five direct
subsidiaries.16 They are listed below. One of the principal
underwriters, Lawyers Title, was actually a subsidiary of
LandAmerica OneStop, Inc.

14
15
16

Id.
Id.
LANDAMERICA FIN. GRP., INC., FORM 10-K, EX-21, SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT (Feb. 28, 2007).

6
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Events Leading to Chapter 11
Officially beginning in December 2007 and officially
ending in June 2009,17 the Great Recession bludgeoned
the title insurance market. In 2006, residential mortgage
originations in the United States exceeded $2.7 trillion; in
2008, they dropped to about $1.8 trillion.18 Market stresses
slashed LandAmerica’s revenues by over 40% during that
time.19 Between 2006 and 2008, policy losses eroded profits
for the company—these losses increased from 5.2% of operating revenue to 21.1%.20 As the economy collapsed, resulting in reduced housing values and an increased number of
foreclosures, LandAmerica collapsed.21
Exchange Co. was a key contributor to LandAmerica’s
failure.22 In 2002, Exchange Co. began investing a slice of
its 1031 Exchange Funds in auction rate securities
(“ARSs”).23 Highly rated at the time of investment and
backed by federally guaranteed student loans, these ARSs

17

18
19
20
21
22
23

Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709 (last visited Apr. 28, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/K65H-PZF7].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
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later lost luster.24 The market for ARSs froze in 2008.25 Before then, Exchange Co. would buy and sell the normally
highly liquid ARSs to assist its customers with 1031 exchanges.26 But the frozen ARS market disabled Exchange
Co.27 It could no longer sell the ARSs at a price near what
it paid for them, much less at a profit.28
To understand the connection between ARSs and Exchange Co.’s business, one must consider the timeline of a
1031 exchange. A 1031 exchange must be completed by a
taxpayer no later than 180 days after the sale of his or her
exchanged property.29 Imagine that you want to sell investment property in Franklin and that you want to use those
proceeds, tax free, to buy investment property in Brentwood. To qualify for the 1031 tax advantage, the purchase
of the property in Brentwood must occur no later than 180
days after the sale of the property in Franklin.

24

25

26
27
28
29

Id. at 9; Liz Rappaport, Randall Smith & Tom McGinty, Auction-Rate Headaches:
Issuers Search for Ways Around Soaring Costs; Prior Trouble in Market, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 21, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1203553641581814
95?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=9 (“Demand ha[d] collapsed because many
auction-rate securities [were] insured by troubled bond insurers. Investors fear[ed]
the bond insurance [was] no longer good, making the auction-rate securities riskier,
even though many issuers of this debt [were] healthy institutions with strong credit
ratings on their own.”) [https://perma.cc/G8B3-S8FP]; see also Bond Insurance,
WALL ST. SURVIVOR, http://www.wallstreetsurvivor.com/starter-guides/bond-insurance (last visited Apr. 28, 2018) (“Bond insurance is a kind of policy that, in the
event of default, guarantees the repayment of the principal and all associated interest payments to the bondholders.”).
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 9; Yaron Leitner, Why Do Markets
Freeze?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. (2011), https://www.phil.frb.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2011/q2/brq211_why-do-marketsfreeze.pdf (“A market freeze refers to a situation in which trade does not occur despite the potential gains from trade.”) [https://perma.cc/CP9E-H5X9].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (“[A]ny property received by the taxpayer shall be treated as
property which is not like-kind property if . . . such property is received after . . . the
day which is 180 days after the date on which the taxpayer transfers the property
relinquished in the exchange . . . .”).
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So consider Exchange Co.’s position if you are one of its
clients. You transferred the proceeds from the Franklin
property to Exchange Co., and Exchange Co. agreed to
serve as a § 1031 intermediary for your purchase of the
Brentwood property. Similar to most of Exchange Co.’s
other clients, you have time before you need to complete
the transaction—almost half a year. During that period,
Exchange Co. holds your money as it does for its other clients.
Exchange Co. could let the money sit in its account,
waiting for you to close on the Brentwood property before
touching the money again, or Exchange Co. could make
money on that money by investing it. Exchange Co. chose
to make money on the money it held. Exchange Co. invested the money and collected interest payment from
those investments. Exchange Co. primarily invested that
money in ARSs. In 2008, when the ARS market froze, Exchange Co. could no longer sell the ARSs to liquidate the
client funds when needed. Client funds were stuck in those
debt instruments, which could not be sold at a price anywhere near what Exchange Co. had paid for them.

10
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Figure 3

Exchange Co. invested in ARSs because of their perceived appeal in the market and high rate of liquidity. Because of their high liquidity in normal times, Exchange Co.
could simply sell them whenever needed to help its clients
complete their 1031 exchanges. Financial institutions often
marketed ARSs as cash equivalent securities with zero
market risk.30 This was a fallacy. Common usage of ARSs
began in the 1980s.31 Investors who purchased ARSs were
“typically seeking a cash-like investment that [paid] a
higher yield than money market mutual funds or certificates of deposit.”32 While structured as long-term debt instruments, they were effectively short term because they

30
31

32

Amod Choudhary, Auction Rate Securities = Auction Risky Securities, 11 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 23, 32 (2008).
Auction Rate Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/auction-rate-securities (last visited
Apr. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H6FQ-NHHB].
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., AUCTION RATE SECURITIES: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
AUCTIONS FAIL (2008), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Investor-Alert-Auction-Rate-Securities-What-Happens-When-Auctions-Fail.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NRC8-J4NQ].
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were sold at auction several times per month.33 ARS market liquidity was dependent on supply and demand at the
ARS auctions.34 The market for these securities was confined to the primary market as bankers and brokers refused to sell ARSs on the secondary market.35 In the past,
when the market for these securities began to fail, the financial institutions stepped in and bid on the securities
they already owned to stabilize the market.36 By bidding
on their securities, these financial institutions “creat[ed] a
false sense of demand in the minds of investors.”37 Brokers
did not disclose to potential investors that the financial institutions themselves were bidding on the ARSs to prevent
market failure.38 Thus, the ARS market was dependent on
the continued success of the nation’s major financial institutions.39 In February 2008, those auctions began to fail
when supply exceeded demand.40
Many of the financial institutions that participated in
the auction rate securities market had considerable losses
resulting from the rising number of defaults on sub-prime
loans in the form of mortgage-backed securities.41 As a re-

33

34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41

Jacqueline Doherty, The Sad Story of Auction-Rate Securities, BARRON’S (May 26,
2008), https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB121159302439419325 (“Participants -both mom-and-pop investors and corporations seeking yields on their cash -- assumed they could sell their securities at auction to new buyers.”) [https://perma.cc/
Z7X4-QEBG].
Sean T. Seelinger, Auction-Rate Securities: A Fast & Furious Fall, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 287, 288 (2009).
Choudhary, supra note 30, at 32 (“[W]ith the threat of actual lawsuits from ARS
holders, the brokers/ banks . . . refused to sell the ARS in the secondary market,
thereby creating a catch-22 situation.”).
Seelinger, supra note 34, at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Choudhary, supra 30, at 31.
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sult, the lack of funds available for these financial institutions to purchase ARSs crippled the ARS market.42 Holders of the securities could no longer quickly get their money
back in the same way that they could with, for example, a
checking account.43 Seven years later—when LFG’s bankruptcy concluded—about $50 billion out of the $330 billion
of ARSs outstanding from 2008 remained frozen.44
As Exchange Co. failed in 2008, LFG pumped money
into it: advancing $65 million.45 That money enabled Exchange Co. to honor customer claims.46 The loan, however,
failed to sustain Exchange Co.47 LFG faced its own liquidity constraints from “stresses in the real estate markets”
and increased policy losses, and Exchange Co. lacked an
alternative to ARSs.48 Exchange Co. could no longer continue in the ordinary course if it let the 1031 exchange
money sit in its account—instead of investing in a highly
liquid financial instrument.49 In sum, LFG needed help.
To assist, LFG employed JP Morgan as financial advisor and investment banker, and Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz as mergers & acquisitions counsel.50 Together, they
considered several options.51 These options included trans-

42
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id.
Jacqueline Doherty, Auction-Rate Securities: Still Frozen in Time, BARRON’S (Mar.
28, 2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/auction-rate-securities-still-frozen-intime-1427505026 [https://perma.cc/4D68-DGQE].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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actions with five strategic partners along with a transaction with LFG’s largest shareholder.52 But none of the potential transactions gained traction, putting LFG in
limbo.53
Without another viable option, the committee determined that its best option was to find a competitor to acquire LFG.54 LFG contacted Fidelity National Financial
(“Fidelity”) to discuss a transaction in an attempt to salvage the company.55 Fidelity is a “provider of title insurance and transaction services to the real estate and mortgage industries.”56 At the time, Fidelity was one of LFG’s
largest competitors.57 After a few short weeks of negotiating, LFG and Fidelity reached a deal.58 On November 7,
2008, LFG and Fidelity signed a merger agreement.59 At
the time, LFG appeared to have salvaged its company and
avoided bankruptcy.
This victory was short lived. The merger was conditioned on Fidelity’s approval following a due diligence period that permitted Fidelity to review LFG’s records.60
Three weeks after the parties announced their proposed
merger, Fidelity announced its plan to exercise its right to

52
53
54
55

56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 11.
Id.; see also About Us, FID. NAT’L FIN., http://www.fnf.com/pages/about-us.aspx (last
visited Apr. 28, 2018) (“FNF is the nation’s largest title insurance company through
its title insurance underwriters - Fidelity National Title, Chicago Title, Commonwealth Land Title, Alamo Title and National Title of New York - that collectively
issue more title insurance policies than any other title company in the United
States.”) [hereinafter About Us] [https://perma.cc/9GKG-M9GM].
About Us, supra note 55.
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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terminate the agreement, citing its “contractual due diligence termination right.”61
Neither firm would comment on the failed merger
agreement beyond the fact that the merger had been
called off. But the terms of the deal, along with Friday’s closing share prices, meant that Fidelity would
have paid nearly a 70 percent premium to acquire
LandAm’s business; Fidelity was to exchange .993 of
its shares for each LandAmerica share. . . . That
LandAm would have agreed in the first place to let
a direct competitor review its books and operations
with an apparently unencumbered right to terminate the deal, however, likely suggests the sort of
dire situation now facing the firm. “Nobody gives a
free look unless they have little other choice,” said
one source, an M&A consultant in the mortgage industry that asked not to be named. “Fidelity had no
incentive to try to find a way to work the deal, and
there were probably some pretty scary ghosts that
bounced up in the due diligence process. There always are.”62
Financing Issues
Days after its merger with Fidelity fell apart, LFG filed
for bankruptcy. LFG entered bankruptcy with over $650
million in liabilities.63 Roughly two-thirds of that debt

61

62
63

Paul Jackson, No Deal: Fidelity Calls off LandAmerica Merger, HOUSING WIRE
(Nov. 24, 2008), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/no-deal-fidelity-calls-landam
erica-merger [https://perma.cc/W972-8ETY].
Id.
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 6.
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arose from a revolving credit facility ($100 million),64 two
series of senior unsecured notes ($150 million),65 and convertible notes ($225 million).66 All of these long-term debt
instruments were unsecured.67
SunTrust Bank led the syndicate of lenders that provided the revolving credit facility.68 LFG defaulted on several covenants under the agreement, so it had no access to
funds from the credit facility when it entered bankruptcy.69
LFG had also issued two series of senior notes to Prudential Investment and other purchasers.70 Before filing its
bankruptcy petition, LFG defaulted on these notes too.71
Finally, LFG issued convertible senior debentures72 in

64

65

66
67
68
69

70
71
72

Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1935, 1938 n.13 (2004) (“For example, credit cards are a form of a revolving
credit facility. The lender sets a ceiling on the cardholder’s ability to borrow; as the
cardholder repays monies borrowed in the past, she has access to new funds.”).
BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 7 (4th ed. 2006) (“A secured debt differs from an unsecured debt in one important respect . . . . [I]f the debtor fails to pay, the secured creditor may have recourse to the property to satisfy the debt.”).
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. The affidavit of CFO G. William Evans did not address the specific covenants
that LFG defaulted on. Id. But some specific examples are provided in a 2008 SEC
filing of LFG:
The effects of the severe downturn in the housing and mortgage markets
caused us to violate the financial debt covenants of our Note Purchase and
Master Shelf Agreement (“Note Purchase Agreement”) and our revolving
credit facility (“Credit Agreement”) as of September 30, 2008. In particular, we did not meet our fixed charge coverage ratio covenant of 1.20:1.0
required for the fiscal quarter ending September 30, 2008 under both the
Note Purchase Agreement and Credit Agreement. In addition, our debt to
total capitalization also exceeded the maximum limit of 37.5% on both facilities.
LANDAMERICA FIN. GRP., INC., FORM 10-Q, QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 73–74 (Nov. 10, 2008).
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 7.
Id.
What Is a Debenture?, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/debenture-bonds/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018) (“A deben-
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2003 and again in 2004.73 The amounts due on these debentures were unpaid when LFG declared bankruptcy.74
First-Day Motions
To commence the bankruptcy proceedings, LFG filed its
voluntary petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.75 Along with the voluntary petition, LFG filed a series of first-day motions. Using the
categories provided in Bankruptcy in Practice, first-day
motions are filed to achieve one of three objectives: (1) facilitating the administration of the estate, (2) maintaining
the day-to-day operations, and (3) honoring pre-petition obligations.76 The following is a recount of LFG’s first-day motions categorized by their objectives.
1. Facilitating the Administration of the Estate
LFG and its subsidiaries moved for joint administration
of the Chapter 11 cases under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rules).77
LFG’s goal was to avoid the additional costs and procedural

73
74
75

76
77

ture is a long-term debt instrument issued by corporations and governments, to secure fresh funds or capital. There is no collateral or physical assets required to backup the debt, as the overall creditworthiness and reputation of the issuer suffice.”)
[https://perma.cc/57FY-EZG8].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 7.
Id.
Voluntary Petition Under Chapter 11 at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No.
08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1 [https://perma.cc/
33RX-7XVR].
MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN & GEORGE W. KUNEY, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE 273–75
(Charles J. Tabb ed., 5th ed. 2015).
Motion for Order Authorizing Joint Administration Pursuant to Rule 1015 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No.
08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 3 [hereinafter Motion
for Joint Administration] [https://perma.cc/5HF3-PER4].
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problems associated with separate but related Chapter 11
cases.78 LFG urged that joint administration would lead to
a more efficient resolution of these cases.79 In support, LFG
asserted that all of the hearings and matters in the separate cases would affect all of the debtors. Thus, they argued
that approval of joint administration would “reduce costs,
facilitate administrative efficiency, and avoid the procedural problems otherwise attendant to the administration
of separate but related chapter 11 cases.”80 LFG also noted
that joint administration would not prejudice any party or
any party’s substantive rights in the case.81 No creditors
objected, and the court later granted the joint administration motion.82
Next, LFG moved to extend its deadline to file its schedules of assets and liabilities, its statement of financial affairs, and the list of its equity security holders.83 LFG
sought a sixty-day extension to file those documents—as
permitted by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c).84 Per that rule’s requirement, “[a]ny extension of time for the filing of the
schedules and statements may be granted only on motion

78

79
80
81

82
83

84

Id. at 3; see also Jay M. Goffman & Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders
in Large Chapter 11 Cases (Critical Vendor, DIP Financing and Cash Management
Issues), 2003 WL 23925660, at *6 (2003) (“If the company is filing multiple affiliated
entities, a motion providing for the joint administration of all related cases under
one case number is generally desirable.”).
Motion for Joint Administration, supra note 77, at 3.
Id.
Id.; see also Goffman & Day, supra note 78, at *6 (“Joint administration, while not
having a substantive effect on the debtors, will allow for pleadings filed in one case
to apply to all related debtors.”).
Motion for Joint Administration, supra note 77, at 8.
Motion of the Debtor for Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) and Local
Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1 Extending Time for LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. To
File Its Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs and List of Equity Security
Holders at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 4 [https://perma.cc/53AW-73WM].
Id.
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for cause shown and on notice.”85 In support of its motion,
LFG claimed cause for an extension because of its limited
resources after filing for bankruptcy.86 Specifically, LFG
submitted that “substantial burdens already imposed on
the Debtor’s management by the commencement of this
chapter 11 case, the limited number of employees available
to collect the information, and the competing demands
upon such employees” constituted sufficient cause to extend the filing deadline.87 The court accepted LFG’s cause
argument and, with no objections to the motion, granted it
to extend the required filing date.88
LFG also hoped to eliminate the administrative cost of
submitting a formatted mailing matrix of its creditors to
the court—as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 10071(I).89 Instead, LFG moved to prepare its own list of its
creditors and to offer access to any party who requested
it.90 This way, the court would no longer need to send notice
to all of LFG’s creditors and parties in interest.91 The court
granted this motion.92
To facilitate an orderly entry into bankruptcy, LFG filed
a motion to continue using its centralized cash management system and to maintain its existing bank accounts.93

85
86
87
88
89

90
91
92
93

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Motion of the Debtors, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 342(a), and 521, Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 1007 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1, for Authority To Prepare a List
of Creditors in Lieu of Submitting a Formatted Mailing Matrix at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008),
ECF No. 6 [https://perma.cc/5XCG-M8BB].
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Motion for Order Authorizing: (A) Continued Use of the Debtor’s Centralized Cash
Management System; (B) Maintenance and Continued Use of the Debtor’s Existing
Bank Accounts and Business Forms; (C) A Waiver of Certain Operating Guidelines
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LFG ran the cash management system for all of its affiliates, including Exchange Co.94 When it filed for bankruptcy, LFG maintained about thirty-one active bank accounts that were linked to the cash management system.95
The court granted this motion too.96
In addition, LFG moved to establish notice, case management, and administrative procedures.97 For example, it
asked the court to allow electronic service of documents.98
To save costs, courts routinely grant requests for limited
notice requirements.99 LFG hoped to use the money saved
to reorganize its business.100 The court granted this motion.101
Further, LFG sought an expedited hearing to consider
approval of the sale of its two principal title underwriting
subsidiaries: Commonwealth NE and Lawyers Title.102 After Exchange Co. failed, LFG needed the proceeds of this
sale to give Exchange Co.’s clients their money back.103

94
95
96
97

98
99
100
101
102

103

Relating to Bank Accounts; and (D) An Extension of Time for the Debtor To Comply
with Section 345 of the Bankruptcy Code at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc.,
No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 5 [https://perma.
cc/TSH6-PAKK].
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 20.
Motion of the Debtors for an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 102 and
105, Bankruptcy Rules 2002 and 9007, and Local Bankruptcy Rules 2002-1 and
9013-1 Establishing Certain Notice, Case Management, and Administrative Procedures at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va.
filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 8 [https://perma.cc/3AK9-V9YJ].
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
Debtor’s Motion for Order: (A) Scheduling Expedited Sale Hearing To Consider Approval of Sale of Debtor’s Stock in Certain Underwriting Subsidiaries; (B) Approving Related Stock Purchase Agreement; (C) Approving Form and Manner of Notice
of Sale Hearing; and (D) Granting Related Relief at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 11 [https://
perma.cc/KND5-FJVZ].
Id. at 7.
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Time was of the essence: LFG argued that customers would
quickly leave the two underwriting companies if they were
not confident that a buyer would promptly sweep the companies up.104
Finally, LFG moved for an expedited hearing on all of
its first-day motions.105 Similar to its other first-day motions, LFG filed for this relief so that it could avoid harm
to its business.106 The court granted this motion too.107
2. Maintaining the Day-to-Day Operations
To assist with its day-to-day operations, LFG filed a motion to keep receiving water, gas, and electricity while in
bankruptcy.108 It sought to keep operating while honoring
the special protections that utility companies have under
the Bankruptcy Code.109 The court granted this motion
too.110

104 Id. at 9–10.
105 Motion of the Debtors, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and Local Bankruptcy Rule

106
107
108

109
110

9031-1(M), for an Order Setting an Expedited Hearing on “First Day Pleadings” and
for Related Relief at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH
(Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 13 [https://perma.cc/JE3C-JNQE].
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Motion of Debtor for Order Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 366 (I) Approving Debtor’s Adequate Assurance of Payment, (II) Establishing Procedures for
Resolving Requests by Utility Companies for Additional Assurance of Payment, and
(III) Scheduling a Hearing with Respect to Contested Adequate Assurance of Payment Requests at 3–4, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH
(Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 9 [https://perma.cc/2EHC-DK22].
Id.
Id. at 16.
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3. Honoring Pre-petition Obligations
LFG moved to obtain court approval to continue to
honor its pre-petition obligations.111 LFG had four goals
when it filed to continue honoring its pre-petition obligations. First, it hoped to continue paying its approximately
7800 employees.112 Second, it wanted to continue reimbursing its employees for their business expenses.113 Third, it
sought to continue providing medical insurance, vision insurance, prescription drug coverage, dental insurance, life
insurance, disability insurance, paid time off, a 401(k)
plan, and other benefits to its employees.114 Fourth, it
wished to continue paying its taxes as an employer.115
Typically, employee’s wages are incurred before the petition date, but the debtor has yet to pay those wages.116 As
a result, employees often “hold considerable prepetition
claims for unpaid salaries or wages.”117 The Bankruptcy
Code prohibits a company from paying pre-petition debts,
including salaries and wages incurred prior to the petition
date, without court authorization.118 Continuing to pay employees is critical to continuing company operations.119
Courts typically grant these motions because a stoppage in

111 Motion for an Order: (A) Authorizing Payment of Prepetition (1) Wages, Salaries,

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

and Other Compensation, (2) Employee Medical and Similar Benefits, (3) Reimbursable Employee Expenses, and (4) Other Miscellaneous Employee Expenses and Benefits; and (B) Granting Related Relief at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No.
08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Motion To Honor Pre-petition Obligations] [https://perma.cc/J8KY-N3J3].
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7–14.
Id. at 14–15.
Goffman & Day, supra note 78, at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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company operations can hurt the debtor’s value and in turn
hurt the debtor’s creditors.120
Pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
bankruptcy court may authorize a Chapter 11 debtor to
honor its pre-petition debts so long as the debtor can “articulate a valid business justification” for such authorization.121 LFG argued in its motion that it had a valid business justification because without authorization to honor
its pre-petition obligations, it would be unable to continue
paying its employees.122 Specifically, LFG maintained that
a failure of the court to grant this motion would “immediately and irreparably” harm the debtor and its employees.123 In support, LFG argued that not paying the employees of its non-debtor subsidiaries would hurt the value of
those subsidiaries and thus harm their creditors in the long
term.124 In the motion, LFG stated “[a]s a parent holding
company, LFG’s primary assets consist of its equity interests in its non-debtor subsidiaries. Thus, it is in LFG’s best
interest to ensure that the value of its subsidiaries is maximized and preserved.”125 There were no objections, and following a hearing,126 the court granted the motion.127

120 Id.
121 Motion To Honor Pre-petition Obligations, supra note 111, at 15.
122 Id. at 3.
123 Id. at 4.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 21.
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Appointment of Committee
One week after LFG filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, the U.S. Trustee appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“OCC”).128 The OCC consisted
of four members: The Bank of New York Mellon; The Prudential Insurance Company of America; Vangent, Inc.; and
Citadel Equity Fund, Ltd.129
The OCC quickly filed an objection to LFG’s proposed
sale of its two principal underwriting subsidiaries, which
produced a significant portion of LFG’s revenue.130 The
OCC argued that the sale was not in the best interests of
LFG’s estate.131 Unsatisfied with the rush to sell the subsidiaries, the OCC wanted LFG to seek other prospective
buyers to ensure that the subsidiaries were sold for the best
price.132 In sum, it hoped to force LFG to produce evidence
demonstrating that the sale price was fair.133
Sale of Two Principal Underwriters
LFG’s two principal title insurance underwriting subsidiaries—Commonwealth NE and Lawyers Title—were

128 Appointment of Unsecured Creditors Committee at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp.,

129
130

131
132
133

Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 72 [https://
perma.cc/BP8J-TXNU].
Id.
Initial Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to the Debtors’
Motion for an Order (A) Scheduling Expedited Sale Hearing To Consider Approval
of Sale of Debtor’s Stock in Certain Underwriting Subsidiaries; (B) Approving Related Stock Purchase Agreement; (C) Approving Form and Manner of Notice of Sale
Hearing; and (D) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc.,
No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 109 [https://
perma.cc/RJS6-M5AP].
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 11.
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both domiciled in Nebraska.134 On November 18, 2008,
fewer than ten days before LFG declared bankruptcy, the
Nebraska Department of Insurance informed both of the
subsidiaries that they were in a “hazardous financial condition.”135 The department based its assessment on their
third quarter 2008 statutory filings.136 After Fidelity terminated its proposed merger agreement, the department
filed a petition in the Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, to put both of the subsidiaries in rehabilitation.137
“Rehabilitation is a state of legal protection for insurance
companies, usually done to protect the company’s insured
clients.”138
Unlike the insolvency of a company such as LFG,
“[i]nsurer insolvencies are governed by state law.”139 Insurance regulators, such as the Nebraska Department of Insurance in this case, seek to protect “policyholders, claimants, and creditors [of insurance companies] from financial
loss.”140 One of the options that an insurance regulator can
take to accomplish its goal is to place an insurance company in rehabilitation.141
If rehabilitation is warranted, state regulators must
allege and prove a specific statutory ground in order

134 Two LandAmerica Title Insurers Sold, Placed in Rehabilitation, LINCOLN J. STAR

135
136
137
138
139

140
141

(Nov. 25, 2008), http://journalstar.com/business/two-landamerica-title-insurerssold-placed-in-rehabilitation/article_d644fe79-69d6-572c-a314-9407970f37f4.html
[hereinafter Placed in Rehabilitation] [https://perma.cc/KN9A-LH5N].
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Placed in Rehabilitation, supra note 134.
Troubled Companies and Receivership, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.
org/cipr_topics/topic_troubled_companies_and_receivership.htm (last visited Apr.
28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/98TB-8BVK].
Id.
Id.
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to proceed. In rehabilitation, a plan is devised to correct the difficulties that led to the insurer being
placed in receivership and return it to the marketplace. The receiver is charged with implementing
the restrictions, limitations and requirements set
forth in the order of rehabilitation.142
This is one of the options that an insurance regulator has
to help a struggling company such as LFG.143
On November 26, 2008, the same day that it filed for
bankruptcy protection, LFG announced the sale of the two
underwriters to Fidelity for $298 million.144 Fidelity agreed
“to pay the $298 million in cash to [LFG] and not take on
any debt.”145 In contrast, the original merger agreement between Fidelity and LFG “called for Fidelity to issue stock
to [LFG] shareholders valued at $128 million, and also pay
off [LFG] debt.”146 At the time, Fidelity was the largest U.S.
title insurer.147 To complete the sale, however, LFG required approval from both the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia and the Nebraska Department of Insurance.148 Less than one month after announcing the sale, LFG obtained approval from both to sell the
two underwriters to Fidelity.149

142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Placed in Rehabilitation, supra note 134.
145 Mark Basch, Fidelity, LandAmerica Back On, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Nov. 27, 2008,

12:01 AM), http://www.jacksonville.com/2016-03-11/stub-265.
146 Id.
147 Joseph A. Giannone, LandAmerica Files for Bankruptcy, Sells Businesses, REUTERS

(Nov. 26, 2008, 3:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-landamerica/landame
rica-files-for-bankruptcy-sells-businesses-idUSTRE4AP1W420081126
[https://perma.cc/49M5-2BNG].
148 Id.
149 Carol Hazard, Bankruptcy Judge OKs LandAmerica Core Sale, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.richmond.com/business/bankruptcy-judge-okslandamerica-core-sale/article_23701ed2-18e9-5bec-a49e-a487beff6805.html
[https://perma.cc/M8C2-QCSQ].
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In response to the approved deal, two of the other largest U.S. title insurers—Stewart Title Guaranty Company
and Old Republic International Corporation—claimed that
the sale raised concerns about anti-competitive behavior in
the industry.150 Specifically, lawyers for one of the companies, Old Republic, claimed that Fidelity “might use [its]
‘near monopoly power’ [after the deal] to artificially inflate
prices.”151 The Federal Trade Commission agreed; it filed a
complaint charging that “the acquisition reduced competition in six geographic areas.”152
At the time, five companies, including LFG, “controlled
93 percent of the $14 billion U.S. title insurance market.”153
With only five companies controlling almost the entire
market, any combination of these companies raised antitrust concerns from the FTC.154 For over a year and a half,
Fidelity negotiated with the FTC to settle the charges that
its acquisition of the LFG subsidiaries was anticompetitive. Finally, in the summer of 2010, Fidelity agreed to settle the charges.155 As part of the settlement, Fidelity agreed
to “sell off several title plants and related assets in Oregon

150 Matt Carter, Fidelity Closes in on LandAmerica Deal, INMAN (Dec. 17, 2008),

151
152

153

154
155

https://www.inman.com/2008/12/17/fidelity-closes-in-landamerica-deal/
[https://perma.cc/S94E-J3BE].
Id.
Fidelity National Financial Settles FTC Charges that Its Acquisition of LandAmerica Subsidiaries Reduced Competition in Title Information Markets, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (July 16, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/07/fidelity-national-financial-settles-ftc-charges-its-acquisition [https://perma.cc/DP646DG4].
Matt Carter, Fidelity, LandAmerica Agree to Merger, INMAN (Nov. 7, 2008),
https://www.inman.com/2008/11/07/fidelity-landamerica-agree-merger/
[https://perma.cc/XT83-XJT4].
Id.
Id.
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and Detroit.”156 In the end, the FTC commissioners voted
5-0 to approve the sale as modified.157
Exchange Company Customers
When LFG declared bankruptcy in 2008, about 450 Exchange Co. customers had 1031 transactions that were in
limbo.158 Those customers had sold their 1031 properties,
and Exchange Co. held the proceeds of those sales.159 It invested a significant portion of those funds “in investment
grade securities rated A or stronger at the time of investment, including auction rate securities.”160 Then the market for those ARSs froze; Exchange Co. could no longer sell
them to get the money to complete those customers’ 1031
exchanges within the statutory frame.161
Of those approximately 450 customers, approximately
50 of them had contracted with Exchange Co. to segregate
their funds—as opposed to allowing them to be commingled.162 The segregated accounts held about $138.6 million.163 The commingled funds, however, were the funds

156 Mark Basch, Fidelity National Financial Settles FTC Complaint by Selling Title

157
158
159
160

161
162
163

Plants in Oregon, Detroit, FLA. TIMES-UNION (July 16, 2010), http://www.jacksonville.com/article/20100716/BUSINESS/801248472.
Id.
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 5–6.
Id.
Id. at 8–9. Exchange Co. was not the only 1031 exchange company to invest in auction rate securities. Real Estate Exchange Services Inc. (“REES”) also invested in
ARSs. In 2008, REES also filed for bankruptcy following the ARS market collapse.
See also Bradley T. Borden, Paul L.B. McKenney & David Shechtman, Like-Kind
Exchanges and Qualified Intermediaries, 124 TAX NOTES 55, 56 (2009) (“It has been
suggested that LES was far from alone in its practice of investing exchange funds
in auction rate securities and that other [qualified intermediaries], like LES, kept
the spread on the return produced by auction rate securities over the growth factor
promised to exchangers, often without disclosing that practice to their customers.”).
Affidavit of G. William Evans, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 6, 8.
Id. at 8.
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that were invested by Exchange Co.164 Of the money held
by Exchange Co. from customers whose funds were commingled, Exchange Co. “maintained approximately $46
million backed by investments in government treasury
bonds and approximately $201.7 million (par value) in auction rate securities.”165 But Exchange Co. had one major
problem—it couldn’t sell the assets. So the customers
couldn’t complete their 1031 transactions within the required 180-day period.
Tracy Ralphs was one of those customers.166 A retired
Army lieutenant colonel, he was working as a transportation engineer in 2008.167 That year, his job moved him from
Virginia to Illinois.168 He hoped to sell his Virginia property
and—with the help of Exchange Co.—to buy property in Illinois.169 All went well when he sold his Virginia property:
$81,000 was successfully wired to Exchange Co.170 Problems began, however, when Ralphs showed up for his 11:30
AM closing on the Illinois property.171
At 11:18, a clerk for the law firm that was conducting the closing walked up and handed him a
piece of paper. “I don’t know how to tell you this, but
you don’t have any money,” she told him.
“LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Services Inc. is no
longer conducting business effective immediately,”
the e-mail from a LandAmerica official said.

164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Chris Adams, Though LandAmerica Clients Lost Millions, No Bailout Granted,

167
168
169
170
171

MCCLATCHY (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/economy/article24577042.html [https://perma.cc/563T-8XU8].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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....
“I had taken my savings from a lifetime of working in the military and invested it. I made a profit. I
followed the laws that Congress made.”
“So you’re telling me the intent of Congress was
to give my money to them so they could make a profit
by risking my life’s savings?” he said.
For the privilege of losing his money, Ralphs had
paid LandAmerica an $850 exchange fee.172
Many suffered a similar fate after trusting their money
with LandAmerica—a company that once “boasted of its inclusion on Fortune magazine’s 2007 list of ‘America’s most
admired companies’” and “said that ‘clients can rest assured’ that LandAmerica didn’t do risky things such as invest in sub-prime mortgages.”173
Over eighty-five adversary proceedings were brought by
exchange customers during the course of the bankruptcy.174 These exchange customers sought recovery of
their funds.175 The adversary proceedings were messy because Exchange Co. used different language throughout
their various agreements with customers.176 On January
16, 2009, the court entered a protocol order.177 This order
stayed all but five of the eighty-five proceedings.178 The five
select cases “presented legal and factual issues that were
common to certain of the other adversary proceedings.” 179

172 Id.
173 Chris Adams,

174
175
176
177
178
179

LandAmerica Touted Its Safety but Clients Lost Millions,
MCCLATCHY (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/economy/article24577048.html [https://perma.cc/V3MT-V6GJ].
Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. LandAmerica 1031 Exch. Servs., Inc. (In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc.), 412 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
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The court ruled on the five cases in two opinions.180 Both
opinions found that the customer’s exchange funds were
property of the bankruptcy estate and that the funds did
not constitute a trust that would exclude them from the
bankruptcy estate.181
More than four years later, however, the liquidation
trustee announced that all Exchange Co. customers had finally been paid back in full.182 But as one commentator
noted, the trustee failed to account for attorneys’ fees,
added taxes, and interest.183 Not to mention the added
stress during “the longest recession since World War II.”184
In sum, the approximately 450 Exchange Co. customers
lost more than simply the money that was frozen in an account.
Lawsuits Against Former Bosses
In 2011, the trustee of the LFG liquidation trust filed a
federal lawsuit against twenty-one former executives and
directors of LandAmerica.185 Bruce Matson, the trustee
plaintiff, sought “$365 million in damages.”186 He asserted
“claims for breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste, equi-

180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Notice of Principal Satisfaction Date at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No.

183

184
185

186

08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 5284 [https://perma.
cc/YK3Y-LMAK].
David Wieland, What Happens if Your Qualified Intermediary Files Bankruptcy?,
REALIZED (June 15, 2016), https://www.realized1031.com/blog/what-happens-ifyour-qualified-intermediary-files-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/E3S6-FZ6A].
Rich, supra note 17.
Michael Schwartz, Former LandAmerica Bosses Slapped with $365M Suit, RICH.
BIZSENSE (July 8, 2011), https://richmondbizsense.com/2011/07/08/former-landamerica-bosses-slapped-with-365m-suit/ [https://perma.cc/2U5H-HRTK].
Id.
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table subordination, and avoidance of change of control employment agreements as fraudulent conveyances.”187 A few
months after the court held that Matson had standing to
bring his claims,188 the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between the parties.189
The twenty-one former executives and directors settled
the lawsuit for $36 million.190 Insurance companies representing the defendants made the substantial recovery possible: “[t]he settlement amount reflect[ed] about 90 percent
of what was available under the insurance policies for the
directors, Matson said.”191 In addition, the defendants
agreed to forgo more than $3 million of severance payments
that they said that they were owed from the company.192 In
sum, the trustee “said he settled the suit because he believed he recovered more for creditors than tying up the issue in court.”193
In 2013, another major federal lawsuit was filed against
former LandAmerica officers and directors.194 This time,
however, the plaintiff sued only fifteen of the former
bosses.195 By filing the lawsuit, Kerrie Borboa purported to
represent “all participants [at least 1000 people] of the

187 Matson v. Alpert (In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc.), 470 B.R. 759, 759 (Bankr.

E.D. Va. 2012).
188 Id.
189 Gregory J. Gilligan, LandAmerica Officers, Directors Settle Suit; Some Creditors Get

190
191
192
193
194

195

100%, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (July 25, 2012), http://www.richmond.com/business/landamerica-officers-directors-settle-suit-some-creditors-get/article_4a3c7967
-bcc1-5511-bd99-aef14554946b.html [https://perma.cc/95D4-8FLU].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michael Schwartz, Lawsuit Against LandAmerica Execs Revived, RICH. BIZSENSE
(Feb. 10, 2014), https://richmondbizsense.com/2014/02/10/lawsuit-against-landame
rica-execs-revived/ [https://perma.cc/K9RU-NE2A].
Id.
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company’s retirement plan through July 2009.”196 Borboa
claimed significant damages for breach of fiduciary duty:
At the end of 2007, the plan held about 812,000
shares of LFG stock, which at the time had a value
of $28.4 million.
A year later, the holdings of LFG stock had increased to more than 850,000, and their value stood
at $76,500. The company terminated its retirement
plan in July 2009.197
In 2015, the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between the parties.198
The fifteen former executives and directors settled the
lawsuit for $5 million.199 Similar to the previous lawsuit
discussed above, insurance coverage for the former executives and directors allowed the class to receive such a substantial settlement.200 But as part of the settlement, the
defendants could get away without an admission of wrongdoing on their part.201 In the end, lead plaintiff Borboa was
awarded $5,000.202
Disclosure Statement and Liquidation Plan
Nearly ten months after filing for bankruptcy, on September 9, 2009, LFG filed its first Chapter 11 plan, disclosure statement, and notice of hearing for approval of the

196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Michael Schwartz, LandAmerica Class-Action Case Settled for $5M, RICH.

199
200
201
202

BIZSENSE (July 27, 2015), https://richmondbizsense.com/2015/07/27/landamericasettles-class-action-case-for-5m/ [https://perma.cc/Y4VJ-FA87].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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disclosure statement.203 Before LFG could solicit votes for
approval or rejection of its Chapter 11 plan, Bankruptcy
Code § 1125(b) required LFG to transmit a copy of the plan
and a disclosure statement approved by the bankruptcy
court to each holder of a claim.204 The bankruptcy court
held a hearing to review the disclosure statement before
approving it. Courts review disclosure statements on a
case-by-case basis,205 and to approve a disclosure statement, the court must find that it contains adequate information.206

203 See Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan for LandAmer-

ica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin.
Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1991
[hereinafter Disclosure Statement] [https://perma.cc/2VHS-PJR7]; Joint Chapter
11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re
LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26,
2008), ECF No. 1992 [hereinafter First Chapter 11 Plan] [https://perma.cc/S9EZ4W4S]; Notice of Hearing and Objection Deadline Regarding Disclosure Statement
with Respect to Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and
Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH
(Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1993 [https://perma.cc/7Y4X-TXTU].
204 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012). This section requires a party soliciting acceptances or
rejections of its proposed plan to transmit “the plan or a summary of the plan, and
a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court as
containing adequate information” to any holder of a claim or interest in the suit. Id.
205 § 1125(a) (“[I]n determining whether a disclosure statement provides adequate information, the court shall consider the complexity of the case, the benefit of additional information to creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional information . . . .”).
206 Id. The Bankruptcy Code defines adequate information as
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of
the debtor's books and records, including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any successor to
the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or
interests in the case, that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the
relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but adequate information need not include such information about any other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a disclosure statement
provides adequate information, the court shall consider the complexity of
the case, the benefit of additional information to creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional information.
Id.
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1. Contents of Disclosure Statement
In its disclosure statement, LFG stated that the purpose of the document was
to set forth information: (i) regarding the history of
the Debtors and their businesses; (ii) describing the
Chapter 11 Cases; (iii) concerning the Plan and alternatives to the Plan; (iv) advising the holders of
Claims and Interests of their rights under the Plan;
and (v) assisting the holders of Claims entitled to
vote on the Plan in making an informed judgment
regarding whether they should vote to accept or reject the Plan.207
The disclosure statement started with an introduction
in section I that informed creditors of important information about approval of the plan.208 In this section, LFG
recommended that each class vote in favor of the plan to
obtain the best available recovery.209 The plan next informed the creditors of the process for approval of the proposed plan, including when the court would hold a hearing
on the plan, each class’s voting rights, and the voting procedure.210
Following section I, section II included a table summarizing the classification and treatment of claims pursuant
to the plan.211 The table also identified “which Classes
[were] entitled to vote on the Plan based on provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.”212

207 Disclosure Statement, supra note 203, at 1.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 2. The recommendation language was the same for each class of creditors.
210 Id. at 3–6.
211 Id. at 6.
212 Id. at 7.
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Section III described LFG’s business structure and the
events that led to the Chapter 11 cases.213 Notably in the
business description section, LFG described the business
practices of its two principle underwriters, Commonwealth
NE and Lawyers Title,214 and its 1031 exchange company,
LES.215 In this section, LFG also described the events that
led to the Chapter 11 cases.216 First, they described the
ARS market collapse and its effect on Exchange Co. and
ultimately LFG.217 Next, this section discussed the strategic alternatives that LFG tried to take, including the proposed merger with Fidelity.218
Section IV gave a description and history of LFG’s
Chapter 11 cases.219 First in subsection 4.1, LFG discussed
the continuation of the business after filing the Chapter 11
cases.220 This discussion included a review of the first-day
motions, the appointment of the creditors committee, the
sale of the two principal underwriters to Fidelity, and the

213 Id. at 16.
214 Id. at 18.
215 Id. at 19. Note that this section included descriptions of LFG’s other holdings.

216
217
218
219
220

First, the “Regulated Underwriters” were described. These included the two principal underwriters, Commonwealth NJ, and United Capital. Second, the “Unregulated Operations” were described. These included (i) LES (Exchange Co.); (ii) LandAmerica Assessment Corporation; (iii) the underwritten title companies (LandAm Title and Southland Entities); (iv) LandAmerica Credit Services, Inc.; (v)
LandAmerica Home Warranty Company, Residential Property Maintenance, Inc.,
LandAmerica Property Inspection Services, Inc., and Buyers Real Estate Services,
Inc.; (vi) LoanCare Servicing Center, Inc. and LC Insurance Agency, Inc.; (vii)
LandAmerica Valuation Corporation; (viii) Capital Title Group; (ix) LandAmerica
Title Insurance Company of Mexico, S.A.; (x) LandAmerica Commercial Search
Services; (xi) LandAmerica Alliance Company; (xii) LandAmerica OneStop, Inc.;
(xiii) Centennial Bank; (xiv) LandAmerica International Holding Company B.V.;
and (xv) LEISA of Connecticut, Inc.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–30.
Id. at 30–32.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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continued operation of LFG’s insurance programs and pension plans.221 Subsection 4.2 described the sale of the rest
of LFG’s assets, including its remaining subsidiaries.222
Subsection 4.3 described the wind down of LFG and the
sale of any remaining assets that the company still held.223
Subsection 4.4 discussed the Exchange Co. litigation.224
These were “adversary proceedings brought by Exchange
Customers asserting causes of action including breach of
contract and fraud, and seeking, among other things, compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.”225
Subsections 4.5 through 4.7 briefly discussed the ARS litigation, government investigation into Exchange Co., and
the administration of the case.226
Section V discussed why LFG needed to solicit acceptances and rejections of the plan from the creditors.227
While this section was the shortest in the disclosure statement, it contained important information. As noted in the
section, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, “for the Bankruptcy Court to confirm the Plan as a consensual plan, the
holders of impaired Claims against the Debtors in each
Class of impaired Claims must accept the Plan by the requisite majorities set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.”228
Here, LFG and the creditors committee recommended

221 Id. at 36–54.
222 Id. at 54–59. This sale of remaining assets included (i) sale of LFG’s stock in LVC;

223
224
225
226
227
228

(ii) sale of LAC’s assets; (iii) sale of LFG’s stock in LoanCare; (iv) sale of LFG’s
stock in Home Warranty; (v) sale of LFG’s stock in RealEC Technologies, Inc; (vi)
sale of LandAm Credit’s assets; (vii) sale of DataTrace; (viii) sale of tax and flood
division of OneStop; and (ix) sale of origination, default and MSTD (BackInTheBlack®) divisions of OneStop.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 66–70.
Id. at 70.
Id.
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“that all holders of Claims entitled to do so, vote to accept
the Plan.”229
Section VI gave a comprehensive overview of the
plan.230 Additionally, a full copy of the plan was attached
as an exhibit to the disclosure statement.231 The main purpose of the plan overview was to inform each creditor how
the plan would be implemented, what distribution they
would receive, and the manner in which those distributions
would be made.232
Section VII discussed post-effective date litigation.233
This section included descriptions of potential litigation
that LFG might initiate following confirmation of the plan
that might result in increased funds for creditors.234 This
included litigation against parties involved in the “underwriting, offering, marketing or sale of ARS to LES.”235
The next three sections discussed the process of plan
approval.236 Section VIII summarized the confirmation process and requirements.237 Section IX discussed alternatives
to confirmation, including liquidation under Chapter 7 and
alternative settlement.238
Section XI informed creditors and other interest holders
of certain risk factors that they should consider along with
the plan.239 These risks included general bankruptcy considerations, such as what would happen if the plan was not
approved, how the court might rule on some objections, and

229 Id. at 71.
230 Id. at 71–92.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 93.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 94.
237 Id. at 100.
238 Id. at 101.
239 Id. at 103–15.
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risks that come with liquidation.240 Additionally, LFG
warned that “[a]ctual recoveries may differ materially from
the estimated recoveries set forth in this Disclosure Statement.”241
Lastly, section XII summarized “significant United
States federal income tax consequences of the Plan to certain holders of Claims or Interests.”242
2. Amendments and Objections
On October 2, 2009, LFG submitted its first amended
copy of the disclosure statement.243 The amended disclosure statement contained numerous changes and additions. Those changes and additions included (i) updates to
the estimated recovery of each claimant or interest
holder;244 (ii) updates to LFG’s ongoing business including
(a) updates to the sale of LFG’s remaining subsidiaries;245
and (b) updates to LFG’s ongoing insurance programs regarding coverage amounts and notice insurance claims;246
(iii) an updated estimate range of $195.1 million to $281.3
million for the proceeds from the sale of LFG and its remaining assets; and (iv) updates to the recovery process for
Exchange Co. customers.247

240 Id. at 103–10.
241 Id. at 106.
242 Id. at 115.
243 Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan for LandAmerica

244
245
246
247

Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2110 [hereinafter Amended Disclosure Statement] [https://perma.cc/VG7F-WL2N].
Id. at 8–24.
Id. at 27–34.
Id. at 56–58.
Id. at 87–89.
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There were six filed objections to the amended disclosure statement. Trustee of the W.M. Thompson, Jr. revocable trust objected on the grounds that the amended disclosure statement did not “discuss the terms of an inter-trust
agreement between the [Exchange Co.] Trust and the LFG
Trust which is to govern how these two trusts will cooperate.”248 Attorneys for the Matthew B. Luxenberg revocable
family trust (“Luxenberg”) objected to the filing deadline.249 The attorneys argued that the deadlines did not
give them enough time to review the disclosure statement
or the amended disclosure statement, and to make timely
objections.250 Two days later, the attorneys of Luxenberg
filed a supplemental objection to the amended disclosure
statement accompanying their original objection.251 The

248 Objection to Amended Disclosure Statement at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc.,

No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2115 [https://
perma.cc/547S-55AY]. The inter-trust agreement is found in section 1.77 and section 8.6 of LFG’s Chapter 11 plan.
249 Objection to the Amended Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter
11 Plan for LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In
re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26,
2008), ECF No. 2117 [https://perma.cc/D7DU-KRMB].
250 Id. at 2–3. Specifically, Luxenberg objected on the grounds that LFG filing their
amended disclosure statement at 10:00 PM on Friday, October 2, 2009, with the
deadline for objections to the plan ending on Monday, October 5, 2009, at 4:00 PM,
did not give Luxenberg’s counsel time to sufficiently review the document. Id.
251 Supplemental Objection of Matthew B. Luxenberg to the Amended Disclosure
Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan or LandAmerica Financial
Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No.
08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2160 [https://
perma.cc/UF58-V7XU]. Luxenberg made the following objections: (i) the Chapter 11
Plan deviated from court-ordered mediation conducted on July 13 and 14, 2009, but
the disclosure statement made no reference to the deviation despite LFG and the
committees acknowledging the inconsistency; (ii) a majority of the Exchange Co.
creditors would not understand the amended disclosure statement as currently
drafted because of its length, reliance on legalese and overall difficulty to understand; (iii) LFG did not address any of Luxenberg’s previous comments to, suggestions to, and questions about the amended disclosure statement in the document;
(iv) the scope of the channeling injunction contained in the amended plan was unclear; (v) lack of “adequate information regarding the trusts to be established under
the Amended Plan”; and (vi) “the Amended Disclosure Statement fail[ed] to address
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Grunstead Family Limited Partnership (“Grunstead”) filed
an objection because it believed that the disclosure statement did not contain a complete discussion of the pending
Exchange Co. litigation, which included nearly 100 adversary proceedings.252 Angela M. Arthur, as Trustee of the
Arthur Declaration of Trust, dated December 29, 1988;
Leapin Eagle, LLC; Vivian R. Hays; Denise J. Wilson; Gerald R. Terry; Ann T. Robbins,; and Jane T. Evans (collectively “Objectors”) objected to the adequacy of information
contained in the amended disclosure statement and urged
the court to reject the disclosure statement pursuant to the
adequate information requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C. §
1125.253 The creditors committee also filed an objection requesting that “the Court not approve the Disclosure Statement until all open issues with the Draft Plan and Disclosure Statement [were] resolved.”254

certain Multi-District Litigation currently pending against SunTrust Bank and certain officers and directors.” Id. at 1–5.
252 Grunstead Family Limited Partnership’s Objection to Approval of Debtors’
Amended Disclosure Statement at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 0835994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2121 [https://perma.cc/
V897-K6CX].
253 Objection to Amended Disclosure Statement of Joint Debtors at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF
No. 2146 [https://perma.cc/3VMS-ZG54]. Objectors objected to the following: (i) release of exchanger claims against LFG because the release “render[ed] the plan facially defective and non-confirmable”; (ii) LFG’s characterization of the permanent
injunction against third-party claims as a “channeling” injunction was “false and
misleading”; (iii) the disclosure statement did not adequately disclose other litigation; (iv) the plan did not properly disclose purported tolling agreements; (v) the
disclosure statement was misleading in its description of purported “Waterfall” distributions; and (vi) the disclosure statement lacked disclosures of the amended
plan’s treatment of exculpation and injunctions. Id. at 7–21.
254 Response of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. to the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint
Chapter 11 Plan for LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors,
and in the Alternative, Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of
LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. for Entry of an Order Approving Form of Letter
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On October 12, 2009, LFG submitted its second
amended disclosure statement, which contained changes
and additions in response to the objections filed.255 LFG
further described updated information regarding the Exchange Co. litigation, comprising of more than 100 adversary proceedings in response to the Grunstead objection.256
LFG also attached a table outlining those pending adversary proceedings against it as an exhibit to the disclosure
statement.257 LFG added a section describing the class action litigation taking place against SunTrust Bank, Inc., in
which some of LFG’s and Exchange Co.’s officers were parties in response to one of the objections made in Luxenberg’s supplemental objection.258 LFG also added a section
outlining how trusts could make claims against directors
and officers.259 Additionally, LFG provided more information about the tolling agreements in response to the Objectors’ objection.260 One day after filing its second
amended disclosure statement, LFG filed its third and final

255

256
257

258
259
260

to Unsecured Creditors in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Plan at 5, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008),
ECF No. 2174 [https://perma.cc/Y7UE-C335].
Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica
Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2186 [hereinafter Second Amended Disclosure Statement] [https://perma.cc/T3LE-R4M3].
Id. at 71.
Exhibit 5 to Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF
No. 2186-5 [https://perma.cc/T5GQ-HP8S].
Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 255, at 78–79.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
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amended disclosure statement.261 The second amendment
contained no major changes or additions.262
3. Approval of Disclosure Statement
On October 14, 2009, the bankruptcy court issued an
omnibus order approving the disclosure statement.263 The
court found that the disclosure statement contained “adequate information” as defined by section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code.264 The court overruled any objections to the
disclosure statement not previously resolved. Further, the
court authorized LFG to commence distributing “solicitation materials” to claim and interest holders.265 In the order, the court also established a November 10, 2009, deadline for claim and interest holders to submit a ballot to vote
to accept or reject the plan.266 Finally, the court set the date
for the confirmation hearing for approval of the plan for
November 18, 2009.267

261 Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica

262
263

264
265

266
267

Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp.,
Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2207
[https://perma.cc/SGE8-T49Q].
Id. The only notable changes were updated dates regarding hearings and voting
procedures, and updates to on-going litigation. Id.
Omnibus Order: (A) Approving Disclosure Statement; (B) Fixing Voting Record
Date; (C) Approving Solicitation Materials and Procedures for Distribution Thereof;
(D) Approving Forms of Ballots and Establishing Procedures for Voting on Debtors’
Plan; (E) Scheduling Hearing and Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures in
Respect of Confirmation of Debtors’ Plan; and (F) Granting Related Relief at 1, In
re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26,
2008), ECF No. 2214 [https://perma.cc/TC9C-8F4J].
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4. Solicitation materials included (i) the disclosure statement order and exhibits; (ii) a ballot with return envelope, disclosure statement, and the plan and
exhibits attached; (iii) a notice of non-voting status; and (iv) a letter of support from
the LES (Exchange Co.) committee or the LFG committee, as applicable. Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 14.
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4. Liquidation Plan
Along with the disclosure statement, LFG filed the first
copy of its Chapter 11 plans on September 9, 2009.268 The
first plan was seventy pages long,269 and it contained sixteen articles.270
In article I, several definitions were provided.271 For example, “Class means each category of Claims or Interests
established under Article IV of the Plan pursuant to sections 1122 and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.”272 Also,
the plan defined “Exchange Funds” as “the net consideration from the sale of relinquished property acquired by LES
pursuant to an Exchange Agreement.”273 Further, the plan
defined “General Unsecured Claim” by describing what it
is not—for example, it is not “a Secured Claim” or “an Administrative Expense Claim.”274 In addition, the plan defined “Notice Parties” as “(a) the U.S. Trustee, (b) the LES
Trustee, (c) the LES Trust Committee, (d) the LFG Trustee, and (e) the LFG Trust Committee.”275

268 First Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 203, at 1; see also BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, supra

269
270

271
272
273
274
275

note 76, at 516 (outlining how a Chapter 11 case is resolved, from negotiation with
creditors to approval of debtor’s plan by the court).
First Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 203, at 70.
Id. at 2–5. The articles included (i) definitions and interpretation, (ii) resolution of
certain inter-creditor and inter-debtor issues, (iii) administrative expense claims,
fee claims, U.S. trustee fees and priority tax claims, (iv) classification of claims and
interests, (v) treatment of claims and interests, (vi) acceptance or rejection of the
plan; effect of rejection by one or more classes of claims or interests, (vii) means for
implementation, (viii) the trusts, (ix) distributions, (x) procedures for resolving
claims, (xi) procedures for LES (Exchange Co.) damages claims, (xii) executory contracts and unexpired leases, (xiii) conditions precedent to consummation of the plan,
(xiv) effect of confirmation, (xv) retention of jurisdiction, and (xvi) miscellaneous
provisions. Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 20.
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In article I, the plan also explained what rules of construction apply to the document.276 All of “the rules of construction contained in section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code
shall apply to the construction of the Plan,” but not “the
rules of construction contained in sections 102(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code.”277 That specific excluded section explains that “’or’ is not exclusive.”278 Further, “[a]ll Plan
Documents and appendices to the Plan [were] incorporated
into the Plan by reference and [were] part of the Plan as if
set forth in full [in it].”279
In article II, the plan explained how certain inter-creditor issues and intercompany claims would be resolved.280
To confirm the plan, the bankruptcy court would agree that
it “constitute[d] a good faith compromise and settlement of
all Claims or controversies . . . pursuant to this Plan.”281
Also, the plan would relegate the holders of “prepetition Intercompany Claims” to the status of unsecured creditors.282
In article III, the plan divided the types of claims into
four groups: (1) administrative expenses claims, (2) fee
claims, (3) U.S. trustee fees, and (4) priority tax claims.283
Using all caps, the plan encouraged holders of administrative expense claims to timely file or be forever barred.284
The plan repeated an all caps warning for fee claims.285

276 Id. at 26.
277 Id.
278 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2012) (“In this title . . . ‘after notice and a hearing,’ or a similar

phrase . . . ‘or’ is not exclusive . . . .”).
279 First Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 203, at 27.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 28.
284 Id. at 29.
285 Id.
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Also, the plan explained how outstanding U.S. trustee fees
and allowed priority tax claims would be paid.286
In article IV, the plan designated the various classes of
claims.287 First, eight classes were associated with LES
(Exchange Co.): priority non-tax claims, secured claims, escrow exchange claims, segregated exchange principal
claims, note exchange collectible claims, general unsecured
claims, damages claims, and equity interests.288 Second,
six classes were associated with LFG: priority non-tax
claims, secured claims, general unsecured claims, exchange guarantee claims, securities law claims, and equity
interests.289 Third, four classes were associated with subsidiary debtors: priority non-tax claims, secured claims,
general unsecured claims, and equity interests.290 Then
each class was further separated based on whether it was
impaired or unimpaired by the plan and whether it was entitled to vote or deemed to accept.291
In article V, the plan described how fourteen different
types of claims and interests were treated.292 They were
priority non-tax claims, secured claims, LES (Exchange
Co.) escrow exchange claims, segregated exchange principal claims, note exchange collectible claims, LES (Exchange Co.) general unsecured claims, LES (Exchange Co.)
damages claims, LES (Exchange Co.) equity interests, LFG
general unsecured claims, LFG exchange guarantee
claims, LFG securities law claims, LFG equity interests,

286 Id. at 30.
287 Id. at 31.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 33–37.
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subsidiary general unsecured claims, and subsidiary equity interests.293 For example, “legal, equitable and contractual rights of the holders of [Secured] Claims [were] unaltered by [the] Plan.”294 Also, because “Secured Claims
[were] not impaired Claims,” under “section 1126(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the holders of Secured Claims [were]
conclusively presumed to accept [the] Plan and [were] not
entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.”295 Finally,
holders of secured claims became holders of general unsecured claims for the unsecured portion of their claims if
“the value of the Collateral securing each Secured Claim
[was] less than the amount of such Secured Claim.”296 Below is a table depicting the treatment of each class under
the plan.297

293 Id.
294 Id. at 33.
295 Id. at 34.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 30.
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Figure 4
Class

Designation

LES
Class LES 1 LES Priority Non-Tax Claims
Class LES 2 LES Secured Claims
Class LES 3 LES Escrow Exchange Claims
Segregated Exchange Principal
Class LES 4
Claims
Note Exchange Collectible
Class LES 5
Claims
Class LES 6 LES General Unsecured Claims
Class LES 7 LES Damages Claims
Class LES 8 LES Equity Interests
LFG
Class LFG 1
Class LFG 2
Class LFG 3
Class LFG 4
Class LFG 5
Class LFG 6

Impairment Entitled to Vote
No

No (Deemed to accept)

No

No (Deemed to accept)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

LFG Priority Non-Tax Claims

No

No (Deemed to accept)

LFG Secured Claims

No

No (Deemed to accept)

LFG General Unsecured Claims Yes

Yes

LFG Exchange Guarantee Claims Yes

Yes

LFG Securities Law Claims

Yes

Yes

LFG Equity Interests

Yes

No (Deemed to reject)

No

No (Deemed to accept)

No

No (Deemed to accept)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Subsidiary Debtors
Subsidiary Priority Non-Tax
Class SD 1
Claims
Class SD 2 Subsidiary Secured Claims
Subsidiary General Unsecured
Class SD 3
Claims
Class SD 4 Subsidiary Equity Interests

In article VI, the plan explained how it could be accepted or rejected and how a rejection by one or more classes of claims or interests would affect the plan.298 Plan acceptance by a particular class of claims required acceptance
“by at least two-third (2/3) in amount” and “more than one-

298 Id. at 38.
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half (1/2) in number of holders.”299 Also, the “Debtors, with
the prior written consent of each of the Creditors Committees, [could] request confirmation of [the] Plan . . . under
section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.”300 The plan referred to this option as a “Cramdown.”301 Finally, the complete plan could not be confirmed until “confirmed as to
each of the Debtors.”302
In article VII, the plan described the means of implementation of the plan.303 For example, “entry of the Confirmation Order . . . constitute[d] authorization for the Debtors, their Subsidiaries, the Trustees, or the Trust Committees . . . to implement all provisions of . . . the Plan.”304 Also,
the plan authorized the subsidiary debtor trustees to “monetize and convert the Assets of the Subsidiary Debtors to
Cash and make timely distributions to the holders of [Subsidiary Debtor] Trust Interests.”305
In article VIII, the plan covered the newly created
trusts.306
On the Effective Date, each of the Trusts and their
associated Sub-Trusts, including an SD Trust for
each Subsidiary Debtor, shall be established as liquidating trusts for the primary purpose of monetizing and distributing the Trust Assets to holders of
Trust Interests with no objective to continue or engage in the conduct of a trade or any other business,
except to the extent reasonably necessary to, and

299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 39.
304 Id. at 41.
305 Id. at 42.
306 Id. at 44.
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consistent with, the liquidating purpose of the
Trusts.307
Also, “[e]ach Trust [was] required to distribute at least annually to the applicable holders of Trust Interests.”308 Further, “upon the distribution or abandonment of all of its
Trust Assets,” each trust would terminate.309
In article IX, the plan covered distributions.310 The distributions would be made “in complete settlement, satisfaction and discharge of such Allowed Claims or Allowed Interests.”311 Also, “[n]o fractional Trust Interests [would] be
distributed.”312 Finally, the plan explained how it complied
with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, as amended.313
In article X, the plan explained the procedures for resolving claims.314 A period of “one-hundred twenty (120)
days after the Effective Date” was established when objections would have to be served and filed.315 Also, “Disputed
Claims [would] not be entitled to any Plan Distributions
unless and until such Claims became Allowed Claims.”316
In addition, “reasonable fees and expenses incurred . . . in
connection with implementation of [the] Plan . . . [would]
be paid in Cash in the ordinary course of business by the
Trustees or Post-Effective Date Entities.”317

307 Id.
308 Id. at 46.
309 Id. at 47.
310 Id. at 49.
311 Id. at 50.
312 Id. at 51.
313 Id. at 52.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 53.
317 Id. at 55.
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In article XI, the plan described the procedures for LES
(Exchange Co.) damages claims.318 The plan provided a
timeline for when Exchange Co. damages claims would be
allowed.319 Also, “no Plan Distribution [would] be made on
account of LES Damages Claims” if “the Principal Satisfaction Date [did] not occur prior to the termination of the LES
Trust.”320
In article XII, the plan covered executory contracts and
unexpired leases.321 Generally, as of the effective date, “all
executory contracts and unexpired leases to which a Debtor
[was] a party [would] be deemed rejected.” 322 In addition,
“[a]ll contracts, agreements and leases that were entered
into by LES or LFG . . . after the Petition Date [would] be
deemed assigned by LES or LFG to the respective Trust on
the Effective Date.”323
In article XIII, the plan explained conditions precedent
to consummation of the plan.324 Some of the conditions
precedent included “the Confirmation Order having become a Final Order,” “the Trust Agreements [having] been
fully executed,” and no “stay or injunction (or similar prohibition) in effect.”325 Further, “the Confirmation Order
[would] not be vacated if all of the conditions to consummation [were] either satisfied or duly waived.”326
In article XIV, the plan described the effect of confirmation.327

318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 56.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 58.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 59.
327 Id.
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[O]n or after the Confirmation Date, the provisions
of [the] Plan [would] bind any holder of a Claim
against, or Interest in, the Debtors and inure to the
benefit of and be binding on such holder’s respective
successors and assigns, whether or not the Claim or
Interest of such holder is impaired under [the] Plan
and whether or not such holder has accepted [the]
Plan.328
Also, “all holders of Claims and Interests and other parties
in interest [would] be enjoined from taking any actions to
interfere with the implementation or consummation of
[the] Plan.”329
In article XV, the plan covered retention of jurisdiction.330 Even after confirmation of the plan, the bankruptcy
court would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the LFG case
for several purposes.331 Among them, the bankruptcy court
would retain exclusive jurisdiction “[t]o ensure that distributions to holders of Allowed Claims or Allowed Interests
are accomplished as provided [in the plan],” “[t]o recover
all Assets of the Debtors and property of the Estates, wherever located,” and “[t]o enter a final decree closing each of
the Chapter 11 Cases.”332
In article XVI, the plan described all miscellaneous provisions.333 One provision explained that “[t]he Creditors
Committees [would] be automatically dissolved upon the
Effective Date.”334 Another provision stated that “[t]he
Debtors reserve the right to revoke or withdraw [the] Plan

328 Id.
329 Id. at 60.
330 Id. at 63.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 63–64.
333 Id. at 65.
334 Id.

52

KELLY , MOORE

& HENNINGER

prior to the Effective Date.”335 Finally, the last provision in
the article provided that “the Plan [would] have no force or
effect unless the Bankruptcy Court [would] enter the Confirmation Order.”336
Before obtaining creditor and court approval, LFG filed
five more plans over the next couple of months—on October
2,337 October 12,338 October 13,339 October 24,340 and November 16.341 In seventy-six pages, the final document explained how LFG would distribute funds to its creditors after liquidating its assets.342 The final plan contained all of
the articles and article subsections from the original plan,
but the final plan contained four additional article subsections.343
First, the final plan added a subsection about tolling
agreements within the article covering means for implementation.344 It simply stated the following: “The statute

335 Id. at 66.
336 Id. at 69.
337 Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated

338

339

340

341

342
343
344

Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2109 [https://perma.cc/WD4N-CKTL].
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2185 [https://perma.cc/48QC-6U7M].
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2206 [https://perma.cc/VC2R-BLMF].
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2342 [https://perma.cc/8NLU-SQ9A].
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D.
Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2576 [hereinafter Final Chapter 11 Plan] [https://
perma.cc/4GXM-2MTS].
Id. at 47.
Final Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 341, at 2–5; First Chapter 11 Plan, supra note
203, at 2–5.
Final Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 341, at 48.
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of limitations for Enjoined Actions against the Tolling Parties are tolled subject to the terms and conditions of the
Tolling Agreements.”345 Also, the plan defined “Tolling
Parties” as “the LES and LFG directors and officers set
forth on Schedule 1.214 of this Plan who are parties to Tolling Agreements.”346
Second, the final plan added a subsection about LFG
guaranteed cash distributions within the article covering
distributions.347 This subsection allowed “[a]ny holder of an
Allowed LFG Exchange Guarantee Claim that elect[ed] to
receive an LFG Guarantee Cash Distribution [to] receive
such distribution from the LFG Trustee.”348
Third, the final plan added a subsection about deemed
allowed claims to the article covering procedures for resolving claims.349 This subsection confirmed that some of the
claims listed on some specific schedules were “deemed Allowed in the amounts and in such Classes as set forth on
such Schedules.”350
Fourth, the final plan added a subsection about the Securities and Exchange Commission to the article covering
miscellaneous provisions.351 This subsection confirmed
that the plan would not “prohibit, impair or delay the Securities and Exchange Commission from continuing or
commencing any current or future suits, actions, investigations or proceedings against the Debtors or any third parties.”352

345 Id.
346 Id. at 29.
347 Id. at 56–57.
348 Id. at 56.
349 Id. at 60.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 75.
352 Id.
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Before creditors and the court approved the final plan,
the U.S. Trustee raised an objection to it.353 In particular,
the he objected to the release of liability for pre-petition officers and directors of LFG, the exculpation of people who
were involved with the Chapter 11 case from negligence,
and the differing treatment proposed for creditors depending on whether they voted in favor of the plan.354 In addition to the U.S. Trustee, more than twenty creditors filed
objections to the plan.355
But despite the objections, 97% of creditors and equity
security-holders voted to approve the plan.356 Next, the
court held a hearing to consider confirmation of the plan on
November 18, 2009.357 In addition, the court later filed its
order confirming the plan on November 23, 2009—missing
the one-year anniversary of LFG’s bankruptcy filing by
only a few days.358
Counsel for LFG proposed that ending litigation and
some of the administrative costs associated with Chapter
11 bankruptcy would help to give higher returns to LFG’s

353 Objection of United States Trustee to Confirmation of Debtors’ Plan of Reorganiza-

354
355

356

357

358

tion at 1, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr. E.D. Va.
filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2554 [hereinafter U.S. Trustee Objection to the Final
Chapter 11 Plan] [https://perma.cc/9YKN-HLMR]; see also BERNSTEIN & KUNEY,
supra note 76, at 15–16 (explaining the duties of the U.S. Trustee); Tina Peng, Trustee Objects to LandAmerica Ch. 11 Plan, LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2009, 12:35 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/134114/trustee-objects-to-landamerica-ch-11-plan
[https://perma.cc/DF55-CXAK].
U.S. Trustee Objection to the Final Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 353, at 2.
Emily C. Dooley, Creditors Approve LandAmerica’s Bankruptcy Exit Plan, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.richmond.com/business/article_669
6898e-b674-5e3a-afb6-48e80d6a57f3.html [https://perma.cc/D4V8-GPKX].
Id.; see also BERNSTEIN & KUNEY, supra note 76, at 516 (explaining how the plan
must receive the requisite votes from the creditors and equity security-holders before the court can confirm it).
Order Confirming Joint Chapter 11 Plan of LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and
Its Affiliated Debtors at 2, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH
(Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2666 [https://perma.cc/ZH4M-YC3N].
Id. at 1.
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creditors.359 Before finally confirming the plan, Judge
Huennekens stated the following:
I think that it was a very, very -- I can’t put enough
verys in front of that -- difficult case, and I realize
that, you know, not everybody is happy, but we have
the happiest of results we could possibly have by being able to distribute monies as quickly as possible
in this case.360
After confirmation, one reporter estimated that unsecured
creditors would receive between two and eighty-one cents
per dollar owed,361 while another reporter estimated that
they would receive thirty-seven cents per dollar owed.362
The final amount that unsecured creditors received was
eighty cents per dollar owed.363

359 Transcript of Hearing Before Honorable Kevin R. Huennekens United States Bank-

360
361

362

363

ruptcy Judge at 8–9, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr.
E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 2701 [https://perma.cc/C89R-BPF9].
Id. at 180.
Emily C. Dooley, Bankruptcy Judge Approves LandAmerica Plan, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.richmond.com/business/bankruptcy-judge-approves-landamerica-plan/article_7619e996-8874-523a-ad78-0e9205726d38.html
[https://perma.cc/VX3K-DJLQ].
Christie Smyth, LandAmerica Ch. 11 Plan Wins OK from Judge, LAW360 (Nov. 24,
2009, 2:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/135891/landamerica-ch-11-planwins-ok-from-judge [https://perma.cc/Z34A-DZ67].
Transcript of Hearing Final Report and Motion for Final Decree (The LandAmerica
Financial Group, Inc., Capital Title Group, Inc., LandAmerica Assessment Corporation, LandAmerica OneStop, Inc., Southland Title Corporation and Southland Title of San Diego Liquidation Trusts’ Final Reports and Motion for (A) The Discharge
of Liquidation Trustees, (B) The Discharge of Dissolution Trustee and (C) Entry of
Final Decrees) Before the Honorable Kevin R. Huennekens, United States Bankruptcy Judge at 4, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr.
E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 5755 [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing Final
Report and Motion for Final Decree] [https://perma.cc/FN7C-Q5LT].
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Final Order
On December 22, 2015, Judge Huennekens issued an
order to close the LFG bankruptcy case.364 The U.S. Trustee reported that “the plan anticipated a 26.2 percent distribution, and the Trust actually distributed 80 percent to
those unsecured creditors.”365 He considered the resolution
of the case “an enormous success for LFG creditors.”366
Nearly seven years after it began, the bankruptcy saga of
LFG came to a close.

364 Final Decree at 3, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994-KRH (Bankr.

E.D. Va. filed Nov. 26, 2008), ECF No. 5754 [https://perma.cc/BLB9-UKBR].
365 Transcript of Hearing Final Report and Motion for Final Decree, supra note 363, at

4.
366 Michael Schwartz, LandAmerica Bankruptcy Coming to a Close, RICH. BIZSENSE

(July 29, 2015), https://richmondbizsense.com/2015/07/29/landamerica-bankruptcycoming-to-500m-close/ [https://perma.cc/WH8D-KBCB].

